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SECRECY AND DISHONESTY: THE
SUPREME COURT, RACIAL
PREFERENCES, AND HIGHER
EDUCATION
Abigail Thernstrom*
Stephan Thernstrom **
One should never count on the U.S. Supreme Court to think
and write clearly-or even to tell the whole truth and nothing
but. Its most famous decisions involving racial equality in the last
half century, starting with Brown v. Board of Education, 1 are, to
put it delicately, a mess. Brown barely qualified as constitutional
reasoning, although the bottom line was certainly right. In The
University of California v. Bakke2 the Court turned what should
have been an easy question into an agonizing one, the result being a dizzying six different opinions. And the majority opinions
in Gratz v. Bollinge,J and Grutter v. Bolinger4 managed to wade
deeper into the constitutional muck, although that hardly
seemed possible beforehand.
Maybe the Court in Brown could not have done better than
it did-given the need for unanimity-but Chief Justice Earl
Warren's opinion is certainly thin, flimsy, and frustrating. The
Fourteenth Amendment is almost missing in action. The Court
relied instead on "psychological knowledge" -mainly the flawed
self-esteem research of Dr. Kenneth Clark. And the decision reaffirmed the central holding in Plessy v. Ferguson 5 -namely, that
it was up to judges to weigh (by often unclear standards) the
costs and benefits of policies that engage in the racial sorting of
American citizens. Racial classifications were not prohibited.
• Senior Fellow, The Manhattan Institute, New York; Commissioner, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.
•• Winthrop Professor o[ History, Harvard University.
I. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
4. 539 u.s. 306 (2003).
5. 163 u.s. 537 {1896).
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Every constitutional law textbook contains some reference to
the soaring rhetoric of Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent in
Plessy, but that dissent was the radical moral vision of a man
who has remained a voice in the constitutional wilderness. 6
Justice Lewis Powell's decisive opinion in Bakke-an opinion in which four other Justices joined only in part-depicted the
Court's role as discerning principles, noted that racial classifications must be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, " 7 and then labeled a "diverse student body" 8 as
an aim that met the "compelling" interest standard. Racial quotas, however, were unacceptable. In its quest for "diversity," a
school could use racial identity only as a "plus" factor, 9 one consideration among many. And while Justice Brennan (joined by
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) argued that "raceconscious action" 10 was required to remedy "the lingering effects
of past societal discrimination," 11 Powell rejected that "amorphous_concept of in~~ry," which, he said, "may be ageless in its
reach mto the past." "Diversity" was evidently more precise or more principled,
in Powell's view. But no other Justice signed on to his reasoning.
Five Justices (Powell plus the Brennan four) did agree, however,
that both the Constitution and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act permitted race-conscious policies-benefits and burdens attached to individuals on the basis of the color of their skin.
Allan Bakke won, the University of California lost, and yet
the decision gave constitutional legitimacy to preferential admissions policies. The Court had drawn an allegedly principled line
between the permissible (race as a "plus" factor) and impermissible (race as decisive) that was meaningless in practice. If race
was in the mix, then race was inevitably decisive. Michael Kinsley has put the point well. "Admission to a prestige institution ... ," he has written, "is what computer types call a "binary"
decision. It's yes or no. You're in or you're out. ... The effect of
any factor in that decision is also binary. It either changes the re-

6. This is the central argument in ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND
CONSTITUTION (1992).
7. 438 U.S. at 299.
8. /d. at 306.
9. /d. at317.
I0. /d. at 336.
11. /d. at 352. That phrase, or slight variations on it, is used repeatedly in the Brennan opinion.
12. /d. at 307.
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sult or it doesn't. It makes all the difference or it makes none at
all. Those are the only possibilities." 13
Powell's diversity rationale allowed race to make "all the
difference." And thus, twenty-five years later in Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court was once again confronted with the problem of
race-driven admissions- precisely the admissions process that
Powell had found unacceptable. For all the trouble to which the
Bakke Court went, with Justices crafting intricate opinions that
amounted to a riot of constitutional confusion, those off the
bench, sifting through applications at the University of Michigan
and elsewhere, read between the lines and understood that five
Justices had signed on to racial double-standards in the admissions process. Race could be a factor-and thus could change the
result. Otherwise inadmissible students would become admissible when racial identity was thrown in the mix.
I

The use of race as a decisive factor in admissions at selective
colleges and universities, however, was kept under wraps. Imitating Powell's fancy footwork, university administrators, spinning
the press and inquisitive preference opponents, insisted that
race-like musical talent and leadership skill-was just one consideration in the search for students who would contribute to a
rich educational environment. Bits and pieces of evidence suggested otherwise, but facts were hard to come by.
In 1991, however, Timothy Maguire, working part time in
the Georgetown registrar's office, discovered that the college
grades and LSA T scores of blacks admitted to the Georgetown
Law Center were dramatically lower than those of their white
peers. 14 Race was not just one of many possible "plus" factors
being considered by the admissions committee; it was the only
consideration that could have explained the acceptance of most
black students. His findings became national news- testimony to
how successful schools had been in keeping their racially preferential policies secret.
Georgetown defenders declared Maguire's findings distorted, and he had no way of further verifying them. 15 But the
13. Michael Kinsley, Wam Di1·ersity? Think Fuzzy, WASH. POST, June 25, 2003, at
A23.
14. See Timothy Maguire. Mv Bow with Affirma!il·e Action, 93 CO~IME:"TARY 50
(Apr. 1992).
15. See Anthony T. Pierce et a!., Degrees of Success: IVith Law School, Graduating
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proverbial cat was out of the bag, and the reality of race-driven
admissions became indisputable with the Hopwood litigation
that resulted in the 1996 finding by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals that the University of Texas School of Law had engaged
in racial discrimination against whites; 16 with the fight in California that ended in the passage of Proposition 209, forbidding racial greferences in the public sector, including higher education; 7 with a similar initiative in the state of Washington; 18 and
with a number of freedom of information lawsuits. Other tantalizing fragments of evidence trickled out, all suggesting that the
weight given to racial and ethnic considerations was in fact very
substantial, amounting in most cases to a flagrant double standard.19
And then William G. Bowen and Derek Bok's widely read
and much celebrated book, The Shape of the River/0 came along.
It was a defense of what the authors called "racially sensitive
admissions," but their own numbers undermined their argument
that schools were engaged in nothing more than morally appealing "sensitivity." Bowen and Bok studied five private schools intensively. Among applicants for admission in 1989 with SAT
scores from 1200 to 1249, 19% of whites and 60% of blacks were
admitted; in the next bracket u~ (1250-1299), 24% of whites and
75% of blacks were accepted. 1 Among applicants with nearperfect scores (1500 or better), over a third of whites were
turned down, but every single black got in. Indeed, black students with scores of 1200-1249 were nearly as likely to be acIs the Test, WASH. POST, May 8, 1991, at A31.
16. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
17. CAL. CO:-.!ST. art. I,* 31.
18. Washington State Civil Rights Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West
Supp. 1999)
19. The relevant evidence available through the end of 1996 is summarized and
evaluated in STEPHA:-; THERNSTROYI & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK
AND WHITE: ONE NATI0:-.1, INDIVISIBLE 386-422 (1997). The best source of more recent
evidence on the powerful inlluence of race in admission is a series of studies that Robert
Lerner & Althea K. Nagai have conducted for the Center for Equal Opportunity. See
Robert Lerner and Althea Nagai, Pervasive Preferences: Racial and Ethnic Discrimination in Undergraduare Admissions Across the Narion, available al http://www.ceousa.org/
multi.html (this study assess the role of race in admissions at 47 public colleges and universities); Robert Lerner & Althea Nagai, Preferences in Medical Educalion: Racial and
Ethnic Preferences al Five Public Medical Schools, available al http://www.ceousa.org/
pdfs/multimed.pdf (this study assesses the role of race in 5 medical schools).
20. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CO'-<SEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
( 1998). Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflecrions on The Shape of rhe
River, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1583 (1999).
21. BowE:-; & BOK, supra note 20, at 27, fig.2.5.
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cepted at Bowen and Bok's five institutions as whites with scores
of 1500 or better. Here was a clear picture of race-driven admissions.
The Shape of the River performed an invaluable service in
providing hard evidence that the schools themselves had never
voluntarily made public. The authors were trusted advocates;
others (outside a tight circle) who tried to explore the issue further had no access either to Bowen and Bok's own data or to
that which admissions offices continued to keep in tightly locked
files. 22 But the secrecy and deceit surrounding preferences at
both public and private institutions of higher education was far
from unique. Preferential policies in employment, contracting,
and voting rights all involved racial double-standards, crafted
without public knowledge or consent and sold as providing nothing more than equal opportunity, blacks and whites on a level
playing field.
Dishonesty has always been the American coin of the realm
when it comes to race-from the Declaration of Independence
to "separate but equal" and beyond. For a brief moment in the
mid-1960s, when the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting
Rights Act were passed, the country seemed to be embarked on
a different course. But policies corrupted by a revised form of
dishonesty were built upon the foundation of these two great
legislative triumphs. At the center of that dishonesty lay the notion that, with ongoing racial sorting, the nation would move beyond race- that old habits would bring new benefits.
II

Racial preferences were the form that racial sorting took
starting in the late 1960s, although they were certainly not what
the framers of the great legislative triumphs of the civil rights
22. Although the Mellon Foundation claimed that it would make the data analyzed
by Bowen and Bok available to other qualified researchers, the remarkable guidelines
that set forth its policies governing access to this material strongly suggested that no
scholar with any reservations about racially preferential policies need apply; Andrew W.
Mellon Foundation, Policies Concerning the College and Beyond Database (Aug. 27,
1988) (on file with authors). This interpretation was confirmed when the sociologist
Robert Lerner, a critic of The Shape of the River, presented a well-crafted proposal for
further analysis of the data Bowen and Bok used to the Mellon Foundation. His request
was denied. It is clear that the Mellon Foundation is hostile to research that docs not
yield answers the foundation likes. For further details, sec Stephan Thcrnstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: A Review of the Evidence, in
ONE AMERICA? POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, NATIONAL IDENTITY, THE DILEMMAS OF
DIVERSITY 169 (Stanley A. Renshon cd., 2001 ).
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movement had in mind. The two statutes were pure antidiscrimination laws: open the restaurants on a color-neutral basis, enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But both were quickly
and radically rewritten behind closed doors to embrace racedriven strategies, benefits attached to membership in certain officially-designated "disadvantaged" groups as defined by race,
ethnicity, gender, or disability. This larger shift in sensibilities
with respect to the meaning of nondiscrimination, and the means
by which it was implemented, is the context in which preferences
in higher education must be seen.
The least known of these re-writing stories is that involving
the Voting Rights Act. 23 In 1965 the Voting Rights Act had one
purpose: black enfranchisement in the Jim Crow South. Its only
point was equal access to the polls, the opportunity to vote, a
guarantee of basic Fifteenth Amendment rights. By 1975, however, the legislation had been amended by a process of administrative and judicial interpretation, the result of which was federal
authority to redistribute political power among racial and ethnic
groups, giving blacks and Hispanics their "fair share" of legislative seats. The act had become a measure to protect minority
candidates from white competition, which is precisely the point
of all preferences in higher education, employment, and contracting. And yet the principles that governed that redistribution
had never been debated in the public arena. Minority voters
were never in on the process of radically rewriting the law. Government attorneys in the U.S. Department of Justice were the
main levers of change, and the standards they used in deciding
the level of protection to which minority candidates were entitled in particular jurisdictions never saw the light of day. In voting, as in other areas, equal opportunity became equal outcomes-proportionate racial and ethnic representation, or as
close to that ideal as the available means made possible.
The history of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is much
the same. Once again, the initial statutory aim was straightforward: to ensure fair employment by outlawing intentional discrimination in a variety of settings. On the question of racebased preferences, the intent of Congress was very clear. No
color-conscious preferences with the aim of ensuring a raciallybalanced workforce. But that was not how the first compliance
chief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
23. For a history of the Voting Rights Act, see ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE
VOTES COUNT'/ AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987).
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(EEOC) read the act, and he was in a position to fashion policy
almost single-handedly-a process that he called "creative administration."24 A statute designed to prevent acts of discrimination was soon transformed into an instrument to maximize the
hiring of members of minority groups. This was not a development to which the public was privy, however. Nor was the shift
from access to outcomes acknowledged in the pubic arena.
"Winks, nods, and disguises" 25 substituted for honesty in every
sphere in which racial preferences were instituted.
Preferences in higher education, then, are but one aspect of
a larger story. They are variations on a common theme. In every
sphere, "anti-discrimination" policies came to involve racial sorting, although that rapid transformation in the meaning of equality was neither demanded nor supported by the public. No grass
roots organizations were responsible for the initial development
of these race-conscious strategies. Moreover, those who designed and implemented them shrouded the process in as much
secrecy as possible and described the policies in the misleading
language of access and opportunity. Presumably university administrators believed in their own programs, and yet they were
not willing to defend them openly and honestly. Until white
plaintiffs sued the University of Michigan, almost no one outside
of the admissions office knew the college had a point system that
gave black and Hispanic applicants extraordinary protection
from their white and Asian peers in the competition for admission.26
The consequence has been a history of deception that continues to this day and, most remarkably, has now been sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bolinger, the University of Michigan Law School case, decided in June 2003. The
university deceived the Court in describing its admissions practices; the Court deceived the American people; and we're stuck,
indefinitely, with racial preferences in higher education (and arguably in other spheres as well) that depend on dishonesty to
survive. Such ongoing dishonesty about racial equality perpetuates the corruption surrounding issues of race that has been
deeply and perniciously embedded in the history of the nation.
24. ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 53 (1971 ).
25. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 305 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
26. The tireless and courageous efforts of one Michigan faculty member, philosopher Carl Cohen, were crucial in finally exposing to the light of day what university admiSSions officers had been doing. See CARL COHDI, NAKED RACIAL PREFERENCES:
THE CASE AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1995).
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III
The University of Michigan was actually a defendant in two
cases involving racial preferences, both decided by the High
Court on June 23, 2003. In Grutter, the issue was law school admissions; in Gratz v. Bollinger, plaintiffs challenged the process
of admitting undergraduates. The college automatically awarded
20 points-one-fifth of the number needed to guarantee admission- to every applicant who was a member of an "underrepresented" racial group. In contrast, Michigan residents got a boost
of only 10 points, and children of alumni received 4. Counselors
could assign an outstanding essay up to 3 points and an applicant's personal achievement, leadership, or public service was
worth up to 5 points, while a perfect 1,600 SAT score merited 12
points.
This was not the constitutionally legitimate process that Justice Powell had described in Bakke, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist wrote for the Court. "The critical criteria are often
individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but
sometimes associated with it," Powell had said. 27 At the University of Michigan's undergraduate college, however, even if a student's '"extraordinary artistic talent' rivaled that of Monet or Picasso, the applicant would receive, at most, five points .... " 28 But
an automatic 20 points would be given to the child of a successful
black physician. The result: race was the "decisive factor for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant. " 29 The system failed the narrow tailoring test. The means
chosen "to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in
diversity" were mechanistic and crude, Rehnquist concluded.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor referred to the
"sharp contrast to the law school's admissions plan, which enables admissions officers to make nuanced judgments with respect to the contributions each ap_Elicant is likely to make to the
diversity of the incoming class." Writing for the majority in
Grutter, it is the central point she makes. The law school "engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file ... ," she claimed. 31 "Unlike the program at issue in
Gratz v. Bollinger. . . the Law School awards no mechanical,
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.

438 u.s. 265,324 (1978).
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,273 (2003).
!d. at 247.
/d. at 279.
539 U.S 306 at 309 (2003).
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predetermined diversity 'bonuses' based on race or ethnicity."
Race was considered as simply one factor among many. The admissions office engaged in a "flexible assessment of applicants'
.
. 1.,33
ta1ents, expenences,
an d potentia
Did she actually believe her own argument? The law school
clearly trafficked in racial double standards. A white or Asian
applicant with, say, an LSAT score of 164-165 and a grade-point
average of 3.25 to 3.49 had only about a 22 percent chance of
getting in. But precisely the same academic profile guaranteed
admission for "under-represented" minority students. 34 The law
school's expert, himself, testified that in 2000, 35 percent of
black and Latino applicants were admitted, but if race were left
out of the equation, the figure would drop ~own to 10 percent of
the underrepresented minority applicants. 3 )
Moreover, in the later stages of the admissions process, the
"individual" assessment was reduced to a daily racial head count,
as Justice Kennedy, writing in dissent, noted. The director of
admissions from 1991 to 1996 monitored reports that tracked exactly where the law school stood in assembling a "critical mass"
of black and Hispanic students. He generated those daily reports
because he knew, he said, that the racial make-up of the entering
class was "something [he] need[ed] to be concerned about .... "
Those reports, Kennedy observed, were used "to recalibrate the
plus factor given to race depending on how close they were to
achieving the Law School's goal of critical mass. " 36 Individual
review had been reduced to racial identity.
Writing in dissent in Gratz, Justice Souter dismissed
O'Connor's feeble-almost laughable-attempt to distinguish
between the law school and undergraduate admissions processes.
If one considers racial diversity a value, then racial identity increases some applicants' chances for admission, Souter pointed
out. "Justice Powell's plus factors necessarily are assigned some
values. The college simply does by a numbered scale what the
law school accomplishes in its 'holistic review' .... " 37 He might
have made an additional point: The law school simply concealed

32.
33.
34.
35.
223a).
36.
37.

I d. at 337
/d. at 315.
Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732,797 (2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003) (citing App. To Pet. For Ccrt.

I d. at 392.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,295 (2003).
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a race-driven admissions process that involved preferences actually greater than those given to undergraduate applicants. 38
As Souter recognized, it's now clear that the Constitution
only demands dishonesty. Arguably taunting his colleagues in
the Gratz majority, he confessed to being "tempted to give
Michigan an extra point of its own for its frankness" -for its explicit undergraduate point system. "Equal protection," he said,
"cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the ones
who hide the ball. " 39 But Souter's playful jab at the majority
gave the undergraduate admissions program too much credit. As
the legal analyst Stuart Taylor has pointed out, Michigan's explicit point system was not frankly acknowledged; it was exposed
through a freedom-of-information request by a member of the
faculty, Carl Cohen, and by subsequent litigation. 40 The undergraduate college was "frank" only behind closed doors, which
left the public no more informed than it was with respect to
Michigan's law school admissions.
Nevertheless, Justice Ginsberg did see a difference between
the "candor" of Gratz and the "camouflage" of Grutter, and declared the latter a futile exercise. 41 Bowen and Bok had made
the same point: "[I]t is very difficult to stop people from finding
a path toward a goal in which they firmly believe," 42 they wrote,
and the goal they really believe in is diversity. One way or another, schools would get the racial mix they wanted. 43 Of course,
the Court could bar institutions from "considering race directly
and forthrightly ... ," they went on to say, but that would likely
"bring forth ingenious efforts to minimize the consequent loss of
38. In his dissenting opinion for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Boggs offered the assessment that, for students with the same LSAT scores, minority applicants with high C to
low B undergraduate averages were admitted at the same rate as majority applicants with
A averages in college. And among applicants with college GPAs in the A range, minorities with LSAT scores in the 70th percentile were admitted at the same rate as majority
applicants with LSATs in the 96th percentile or higher. That, he concluded, was an even
bigger boost than the 20 points the college automatically awarded applicants on the basis
of skin color. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 796 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
39. 539 U.S. 244,298 (2003).
40. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Ted Kennedy's Excellent Idea: Disclosing Admissions Preferences, NAT'Ll., at 292 (2004).
41. 539 U.S. 244 at 304 (2003).
42. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 20, at 288.
43. Bowen and Bok arc simply reporting the frequently expressed views of administrators. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Debater's Notes, NAT'L. REV. ONLINE, (Apr. 1, 2003), at
http:l/www.nationalrevicw.com/clegg/clegg040103.asp (Roger Clegg, general counsel for
the Center for Equal Opportunity, tells the story of how while debating racial preferences at Georgetown University, he was introduced by a university official who casually
announced that the school "will proceed with its affirmative action policies no matter
what the Supreme Court docs" in the Michigan cases).
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diversity by adopting seemingly race-neutral policies that [could]
have a wide variety of other consequences, not all of them benign."44
If barred from using racial double-standards, Bowen and
Bok feared, schools might lower admission standards across the
board. Constrained only by Bakke-and not by any flat prohibition-the University of Michigan law school simply said one
thing and did another, which was evidently constitutionally acceptable. As Justice Kennedy noted, the Court pretended that
racial classifications still demanded strict scrutiny and then
averted its gaze in the face of blatant racial sorting, justified by
the flimsiest of rationales-namely, the need for a "critical mass"
of black and Hispanic students. 45 That need was premised on the
assumption that such a critical mass brings educational benefits:
the weakening of racial stereotypes, better preparation for an increasingly diverse workplace and society, the development of
skills needed in the global marketplace, and the nurturing of the
nation's future leaders.
What, however, was a critical mass? The director of admissions gave a helpful definition: "meaningful numbers" or "meaningful representation." 46 Other administrators came up with
slightly more illuminating answers. The law school dean was
concerned that "underrepresented" minority students not feel
"isolated." 47 In other words, schools need to make sure the
number of black students is sufficient to allow black student organizations, black study groups and so forth. And in many colleges, that critical mass also allows separate dorms, freshman
orientations and graduation celebrations. A school's commitment to "diversity" is essential to the self-segregation so prevalent in institutions of higher education.
The Court not only ignored the self-segregation apparent on
almost every campus, but also substantial social science evidence
that racial double-standards actually hurt race relations on campuses, heightening stereotypes, increasing racial isolation and
tension. 48 The Court referred to enhanced classroom discussion
44. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 20, at 28'!.
45. Grul!cr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 392 (2003).
46. !d. at 318.
47. !d. at 31 '!.
48. See Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, Diversify Distorted: How 1he Universily
of Michigan Wiihheld Data to Hide Evidence of Racial Conflicl and Polarization (May 27,
2003), ami/able a1 hl!p:l/www.ceousa.org/pdfs/hiddendata.pdf (in this paper the authors
offer a probing analysis of data gathered by the University of Michigan itself but ignored
In the testimony proffered by its chief social science witness, Dr. Patricia Gurin). For cvi-
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as a consequence of diversity, and the actual weakening of racial
stereotypes when "nonminority students learn there is no 'minority viewpoint,"' although O'Connor presented no survey data
suggesting such a benefit.
But as Peter Kirsanow, commissioner on the U.S. Commission for Civil Rights, says, the point makes perfect sense. What
minority student would want to sit in a class as spokesperson for
his or her race. "[W]ho would want the burden of presenting the
Hispanic stance on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle? Or the
Native-American perspective on gradient derivatives? Or even
the black position on Gilgamesh? And imagine the clash of cul49
ture regarding the value of pi." Kirsanow admits the argument
has a bit more weight in a course on criminal justice, but either
there is a "black" point of view on Fourth Amendment rights or
there isn't; the Court can't have it both ways. And if "diversity"
is really what's wanted, then why not just pick one black Democrat and one black Republican, or one pro- and one anti-death
penalty Hispanic?
In any case, the whole argument over what whites will learn
from the presence of a critical mass suggests that "diversity" is
for the educational benefit of whites, as a recent graduate of the
University of Michigan (and advocate of preferences) complained to a Wall Street Journal reporter. "[I]t's offensive to students of color," she said. "It sounds as if we're just in college to
enrich the education of white students. 5°
Diversity was a policy driven by the desire to look good-to
have the "aesthetic" facade of virtue, Justice Thomas pointed
dcnce from a national survey of campus opinion on prcfcrcncc-rclatcd issues, sec Stanley
Rothman, S.M. Lipsct, & Neil Neville, Diversity of Affirmative Action: The State of
Campus Opinion, 15 ACAD. QUESTIONS 52 (Fall 2002). On the question of how diversity
relates to educational quality, sec Rothman ct. al., Does Enrollment Diversity Improve
University Educational Quality?, 15 INT'L J. OF PUB. OPINION RES. 8 (Spring 2003) and
Thomas E. Wood & Malcom J. Sherman, Is Campus Racial Diversity Correlated with Educational Benefits? (Apr. 4, 2001 ), available at http://www.nas.org/rcports/umich_divcrsity/
umich_uncorrcla tc. pdf.
49. Peter Kirasanow, Still Unconstitlllional, NAT'L. REV. ONLINE, (Sept. 30, 2003),
at http://www.nationalrcvicw.com/commcnt/kirasanow200309300914.asp.
50. Daniel Golden, Some Backers of Racial preference Take Legal Stand Beyond
Diversity: Society Wins with Integrated Elite, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2003, at Bl. The diversity argument has had numerous critics on the political left, on and off the bench, who
view preferences as justified primarily by ongoing societal discrimination. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Affirmative Reaction: The Courts, the Right, and the Race Question, 14 A!\1.
PROSPECT 49 (March 2003). See also supra notes 10 - 11 and accompanying text (the
opinions of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White in Bakke) and supra notes
37, 39 & 41 and accompanying text (the opinions of Justices Ginsberg and Souter m
Gratz and in Gruuer).
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out (dissenting in Grutter). The school wanted "to have a certain
appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in its classrooms to the color of the students sitting at them.") 1 The reason
was clear. When "our institutions engineer the visibility of black
and brown faces," Shelby Steele has written, they erect a "firewall that protects them from stigmatization as racist. " 52
The alternative to racial double standards is not all-white
schools, it's important to remember. Asians (counted as a racial
group by the US Census) are a powerful presence at all highly
selective institutions of higher education. Moreover, Bowen and
Bok calculated that approximately half the black students did
not need racial preferences to gain admission to the selective
schools they studied. 53
In any case, the definition of diversity used in all racial preference programs is remarkably narrow. Samuel Issacharoff, the
Columbia University law professor who represented the University of Texas in the 1966 Hopwood case, is certainly a proponent
of race-conscious admissions programs, but he won't buy the diversity argument. It's "not real," he has said, noting that "[n]one
of these universities has an affirmative-action program for Christian Fundamentalists, Muslims, orthodox Jews, or any other
group that has a distinct viewpoint. " 54 Distinct viewpoints have
never been part of the "diversity" mix. As Justice Kennedy, dissenting in Grutter, reported, University of Michigan law school
faculty members were described by an admissions director as
"'breathtakingly cynical' in deciding who would qualify as a
member of underrepresented minorities." There was a debate on
whether Cubans should count as Hispanics; one professor objected on the ground that they tended to be Republicans. 55
IV
As Roger Clegg, general counsel for the Center for Equal
Opportunity, has noted, "[t]he scary thing about the diversity rationale is that it will always be available." 56 But O'Connor's argument that a "critical mass" of "underrepresented" minorities
51. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,355 (2003).
52. Shelby Steele, A Victory for White Guilt, WALL ST. J., June 26,2003, at Al6.
53. Daniel Golden, Some Backers of Racial prefermce Take Dh-ersitv Rationale
Further, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2003, at B I.
·
54. BOWE:-o & BOK, supra note 20, at 42.
55. 539 U.S. at393.
56. Roger Clegg, The Vision Thing, NAT'L. REV. 0:--~u:-oE, (Mar. 25, 2(Xl3), at
http:l/www.nationalreview.com/clegglclegg032503.asp
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was educationally essential in fact stopped short of preferences
today, preferences tomorrow, preferences forever. In fact, the
point that racial double-standards were not acceptable indefinitely had been made twenty-five years earlier by Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Bakke, who expressed the "earnest hope"
that "within a decade at most" affirmative action policies would
be "a relic of the past." 57 He was dreaming away, but the discomfort with permanent preferences remained on the Court. As Justice Kennedy pointed out in Grutter, if racial classifications were
truly subject to strict scrutiny-if the constitutional standard had
not been radically altered-then it was hard to see how the
Court could defer to the judgment of the universities and suspend that scrutiny until another, and presumably better, day. 58
O'Connor did not really answer Kennedy's unanswerable
point. "We are mindful," she says (quoting a 1984 decision), that
a "core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away
with _all governmentally imposed discrimination based on
race. "' 9 It's an interesting acknowledgment that racial preferences are indeed discriminatory. "Accordingly," she goes on,
"race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. " 60
They are "potentially ... dangerous ... ," and, as the law school
admits, "must have reasonable durational limits. " 61 Preferences,
in other words, must be "temporary"; they must have a "termination point." 62 In Bakke, it may be remembered, Justice
Blackmun had famously said that "in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently." 63 O'Connor, in effect, reiterated the Blackmun principle. The "acid test" of the efficacy of preferences, she declared, was their ability to eliminate
any further need for them. 64 Equal protection demands unequal
protection-although only for a while. With Grutter, however,
Blackmun's ten years turned into fifty. It had been a quarter of a
century since Bakke had been decided; the Court "expect[s],"
O'Connor wrote, "that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary .... " 65 Discrimination was an
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,403 (1978).
539 U.S. at393.
!d. at 341.
!d. at 342.
!d.
!d.
Bakke, 438 U.S at407.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. The •·acid test" notion is actually taken from Nathanson & Bartnik, The Constitwionality of Preferential Treatme/ll for Minority Applicants to
Professional Schools, 58 CHI. BAR REC. 282,293 (May-June 1977).
65. Grutler, 539 U.S. at 343.
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anti-discrimination strategy that would last no longer than half a
century, the Court predicted.

v
O'Connor's expectation of just twenty-five years more was
one more example of the careless, disingenuous pronouncements
that litter the history of racial preferences in higher education
and other spheres. In the last quarter century, she said, "the
number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores
has indeed increased." 6 There was every reason to "expect" that
in another quarter of a century the pool of academically highperforming black and Hispanic applicants would have so grown
as to make race-conscious admissions the strategy of a bygone
era. 67 The credulous reader might believe this confident optimism- this picture of preferences as nothing more than temporary medicine for a problem already fixing itself. The knowledgeable reader will know that she was either scandalously
ignorant of the real record, or deliberately and irresponsibly deceptive.
In fact, there was no empirical basis for O'Connor's faith
that the problem of disproportionately few non-Asian minority
students with strong academic records will have disappeared by
2028-in any case, a depressing number of years. In the following pages, we focus on the continuing and tragic racial gap in
academic achievement between whites and blacks -leaving the
story of high-performing Asians and low-performing Hispanics
and Native Americans for another day. Preferential policies are
primarily driven by concern over the status of blacks in American society, and as long as the admissions process at elite institutions of higher education fails to create a "critical mass" of African American students, schools will not abandon racial
preferences unless compelled to do so.
We do not mean to suggest, for a moment, that the racial
gap cannot be closed, but only that complacent optimism is
deeply misleading. As we argue elsewhere, closing the gap will
take change in American public education much more radical
than that which mainstream reformers now contemplate. 68

66.
67.

!d. at 343.
!d. at 344.
See ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & STEPHAI' THER~STROM, No EXCUSES:

68.
THE RACIAL GAP IN LEARNI;-o;G (2003).
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VI
The best data on what American youngsters know at the
end of high school-when they're ready to apply to Michigan
and other selective colleges- come from the tests administered
to random samples of students by the congressionally-mandated
and federally-administered National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP). 69 Table 1 sets forth the NAEP evidence on
the racial gap in reading, math, and science skills among 17-yearolds from the late 1970s (when Bakke was decided) to 1999. The
simplest way of summarizing the complex results is by calculating the size of the racial gap in standard deviation units. If the
difference in the mean test scores of two groups is a full standard
deviation, the gap is huge. A full standard deviation means that
the average student in the lower-scoring group ranks in the bottom sixth of the distribution of the higher-scoring group; only
one in six would do better than the average for the higherscoring group.
Table 1
The Black-White Gap in the NAEP Reading, Math, and Science
Scores of 17-year-olds in Standard Deviation Units, 1977-1999.
Science
Mathematics
Reading
1.28
1977
1978
1.07
1980
1.19
1.25
0.98
1982
1982
0.79
1984
1.07
1986
1986
0.93
0.55
1988
1.04
0.68
1990
1990
0.71
1990
1.07
1992
0.87
1992
1992
0.86
1.08
1994
1994
0.89
1994
0.66
1.03
0.89
1996
1996
1996
0.69
1.18
1999
1999
1.02
0.73
1999
[Source: Calculated from the National Assessment for Educational Progress Data Tool, at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreporcard/
nepdata!)
At the end of the 1970s, black students were woefully behind whites in all three of the basic subjects tested by NAEP,
with gaps exceeding a full standard deviation. The average black
student had a reading score that put him or her in lOth percentile
69.

Further evidence on the magnitude of racial gap in NAEP scores is supplied in

THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 68, at chs. 1,7, and 12.
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of the white distribution. Only one in ten African American 17year-olds could read as well as the average white nearing the end
of high school. The gap was only slightly smaller in mathematics,
with just 13 percent of black students performing as well as the
average white. The situation was even worse in science, with a
mere 8 percent of African Americans scoring at or above the
white average.
The trend over the next decade, though, was heartening.
The racial gap in reading narrowed especially dramatically, falling by more than half between 1980 and 1988. Progress in math
was only a little less impressive, with the racial gap narrowing by
more than a third. The pace of progress was slower in science,
but the huge gap in that subject did decline by almost 20 percent
between 1977 and 1990.
Had these trends continued, Justice O'Connor's optimism
might have had some foundation in fact. But they did not. Black
students made no further progress towards parity with whites,
and indeed fell further behind between 1988 and 1999. The mean
reading score of African Americans had risen to the 28th percentile in the white distribution by 1988, but it then fell to the 23rd
percentile by 1999. The reversal was even sharper in math skills,
so that black students in 1999 were doing just a shade better than
they had 21 years earlier. African Americans made less progress
in science than in the other two subjects, with the gap never falling below a full standard deviation. But the same regression
took place, with the racial gap widening by 13 percent over the
1990s. If the unfavorable trends of recent years continue, the
University of Michigan and other elite schools will need to give
even greater preferences to black applicants in 2028 than they
currently do.
Perhaps, though, it is misleading to concentrate on group
averages. High school seniors with merely average academic
skills rarely end up in elite law schools, or indeed in any law
school. Suppose we look only at students at the upper end of the
distribution, at the performance of what W.E.B. DuBois called
"the talented tenth." An examination of the scores of the top
tenth of black students, however, yields the same conclusions.
On the 1980 reading assessment, blacks at the 90th percentile of
the black distribution scored one point lower than the average
white student in reading. By 1988, when overall black achievement hit its high point, blacks at the 90th percentile scored at the
same level as whites at the 75th percentile. That was impressive
progress, but the pattern reversed thereafter. By 1999, the top
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tenth of blacks scored midway between the white 50th and 75th
percentiles. Over a third of whites outperformed black students
at the 90th percentile of the black distribution.
In math, the 90th percentile of the black distribution was
barely above the white average in 1978. By 1990 it was just a few
points below the white 75th percentile, strong progress similar to
that made in reading. But in 1999 the scores of blacks at 90th
percentile had plunged, and were a mere 3 points above the
white 50th percentile. The same pattern holds in science. In
1999, as in 1977, black students at the 90th percentile scored a
few points below whites at the 50th percentile.
In sum, except in reading skills, the black talented tenth in
1999 did not stack up any better against their white competitors
for places at selective colleges than they had more than two decades earlier. And even in reading the racial gap remained alarmingly large.
The depressing news conveyed by the N AEP results is further confirmed by the pattern of scores on the College Board
SATs (Table 2). Since the SATs are taken by students who aspire to attend selective colleges, they provide a good sense of the
skills of the better students coming out of high school. From the
mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, the racial gap in SAT scores
followed the trend indicated in the NAEP assessments: black
students were moving ahead more rapidly than whites and catching up. The gap in both verbal and math scores dropped by
about a quarter.
Table 2
Black-White Gaps in Mean SAT Scores, 1975-2000
1976
1981
1987
1991
1996
2000
2003

Verbal
119
110
104
90
92
92
98

Math
139
121
112
104
101
104
108

[Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: 1996, NCES-96-133 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Education, 1996,) 127; 2003 and 2003 from
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www.collegeboard.com/research/home. The recentering of the
scores in 1995, somewhat surprisingly, seems to have had zero
effect on the racial gap.]
Around 1990, however, that progress came to an end. The
dramatic regression- the marked slide downhill- that shows up
in the NAEP data for the 1990s did not occur with SAT scores.
Over the past few years, however, the gap has widened on the
combined SAT scores by a modest 13 points. In the years between 1996 and 2003, the SAT verbal gap increased from .84 to
.88 of a standard deviation, and the math gap from .90 to .94.
While this is not an enormous change, it is significant movement
in the wrong direction. In 2003, both gaps were a mere 6 percent
smaller than they were back in 1981.
The picture looks no brighter at the very top of the distribution. The combined median SAT score of students at our most
selective colleges today is around 1400. In 1999, the top 5.5 percent of whites taking the verbal SATs scored in the 700s, and on
math the top 5.8 percent did 700 or better. But fewer than 1,000
(a mere 0.76 percent) of the 119,000 black students in the nation
who took the exams did that well on the verbal test. And only a
little over 700 African Americans reached 700 in math, just 0.6
percent. White students were 9.8 times as likely as their black
peers to score 750 or better on the verbals, and 13.1 times as
likely to do that well in math. The ratios for those scoring 700749 were also huge-6.2 and 8.7.
VII
Black students applying to college thus typically have much
weaker academic skills than whites. And most depressingly, the
racial gap has narrowed little over the past quarter century.
Moreover, those who have been admitted by racial double standards do not catch up with their white and Asian classmates over
the course of four years at a highly competitive college. Elite institutions do not provide an environment in which non-Asian
minority students with comparatively weak test scores and high
school grades blossom. To the contrary, they tend to perform
worse than objective indicators predict. On the basis of studies
conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s, Robert Klitgard's classic
Choosing Elites estimated that the GPAs of black students at the
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top colleges were about the same as those of whites with combined SAT scores 240 points lower. 70
Later evidence suggests that this is still the case. In their
1998 brief in support of preferential admissions, The Shape of the
River, Bowen and Bok noted the same phenomenon. The average college GP A of black students in the 28 selective schools in
their study put them at the 23rd percentile of their classes, significantly worse than could be predicted from their qualifications
upon entry to the school. "The average rank in class for black
students is appreciably lower than the average rank in class of
white students within each SAT interval," they report. 71 Although they devoted several pages to an attempt to explain this
troubling pattern, they failed to consider one possibility: the
relative poor performance of African American students may be
an unanticipated cost of preferential policies. Perhaps the very
presence of a "critical mass" of black students at these institutions, most of them of them with academic skills well below the
school's average, creates a self-segregated black subculture that
discourages academic achievement.
A more recent study by Stephen Cole and Elinor Barber,
which examined samples of students from Ivy League schools,
other leading liberal arts colleges, some large state universities,
and a few historically black colleges, also found· sharp racial differences in academic performance even when SAT scores were
held constant. Interestingly, the differences were not uniform
across institutions. They were sharpest at the most selective
schools, a fact that they attribute in part to preferential admissions that undermined the beneficiaries' academic selfconfidence.72
We cannot be sure whether the overall racial gap narrows at
all over four years of college because nothing like a N AEP assessment exists for a representative sample of college seniors.
But there are good grounds for doubt. Reliable information
about the academic skills of a large subset of college seniors is
contained in the various tests used in admissions to graduate
schools in the arts and sciences, law, medicine, and business.
70. ROBERT KLITGARD, CHOOSING ELITES: SELECfiNG ''THE BEST AND THE
BRIGHTEST'' AT TOP UNIVERSITIES AND ELSEWHERE 164 (1985).
71. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 20, at 77. For a thorough critical assessment of this
'.\ ork. sec Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 20 (a somewhat shorter version that
includes new mah:rial).
72. STEPHEN COLE & ELI:-;OR BARBER, INCREASING FACULTY DIVERSITY: THE
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES OF HIGH-ACHIEVING MINORITY STUDENTS 121-27 (2[XJ3).
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Several hundred thousand of the best and most ambitious college students each year take the Law School Admissions Test,
the Graduate Management Admissions Test (used by business
schools), the Graduate Records Examination, or the Medical
College Admissions Test.
For more than three decades, strong racial preferences in
admissions have been in place at selective colleges large and
small- at Dartmouth as well as Duke. These elite schools have
made determined efforts to give "underrepresented" minority
students the greatest possible opportunity to develop their intellectual potential. If the policies had been effective, the results
should be apparent in the size of the pool of top applicants to
graduate school. Indeed, by now, race-conscious admissions
should be unnecessary.
And yet Table 3 shows that the racial gaps on all of the
standard tests employed by graduate schools were still enormous
in 1998, the most recent year for which we were able to obtain
the data. Indeed, the gaps were a bit larger than those among
students at the end of high school. The picture revealed in each
of the eight tests reported here is almost identical: the average
black student applying to graduate school scores in the bottom
sixth of all test-takers. The racial gap was never less than .96 of a
standard deviation on any of the eight tests of cognitive skills,
and it exceeded a full standard deviation in three of the eight.
The most selective graduate schools simply cannot admit substantial numbers of black applicants if they apply the same standards of academic achievement to members of all racial and ethmc groups.
The almost complete absence of black students with credentials qualifying for the most competitive law schools is illustrated
by the data on LSA T scores and college grades that were presented bl the Law School Admissions Council in its brief in
7
Grutter. (The Law School Admissions Council has not been
eager to release information about this sensitive subject, but its
brief in Grutter, while written in support of preferences, contained devastating information, underscoring the magnitude of
the racial gap and the racial double-standards used in sifting
through applicants as a result.) In 2002, a total of 4,461 applicants to American law schools had LSAT scores of 165 or better
and college GPAs of at least 3.5. Only 29 of the 4,461 were
73. Brief of Amicus Curiae Law School Admissions Council in Support of Respondents at8-9, Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
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black, 0.65 percent of the total. The 14 highest-ranked law
schools (ranging from Yale to Georgetown) all have median
LSAT scores above 165 and median GPAS above 3.5. If the 29
black students with academic credentials comparable to those of
their average student were apportioned among them, that would
work out to be just two in the first-year class at each school.
Finding that unacceptable, our law schools have chosen to lower
the bar in evaluating black applicants.
Table 3
The Black-White Gap on Various Achievement Tests at Two
Key Transitional Points, in Standard Deviation Units
End of high school
NAAP reading, 1999
SAT verbal, 2003
NAEP math, 1999
SAT math, 2003
NAEP science, 1999

0.73
0.88
1.02
1.0.
1.18

End of college

1.08
LSAT, 1998
1.03
GMAT,1998
0.96
GRE verbal, 1998
0.98
GRE quantitative, 1998
1.11
GRE analytical, 1998
0.96
MCAT verbal, 1998
MCAT physical science, 1998
0.96
MCAT biological science, 1998
0.96
[Source: NAEP figures from Table 1 above. SAT gap calculated from College Entrance Examination Board, 2003 CollegeBound Seniors: A Profile of SAT Program Test Takers (New
York: College Board, 2003), Tables 4.1 and 6. All others as given
in Wayne J. Camara and Amy Elizabeth Schmidt, Group Differences in Standardized Testing and Social Strarification, College
Board Report No. 99-5, New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1999), Table 1.]
For comparative purposes, in order to gauge the trends, the
only data we have are for the years 1997-2002-from the same
Grutter brief. For that five year period, the figures fluctuate only
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slightly, and there is no consistent upward trend. In fact, the 2002
figure was below that for both 1998 and 2000-the percentage of
black high scorers being 0.69 and 0.73, respectively. O'Connor
described a closing racial gap; she was ignoring the Law School
Admissions Council's own numbers.
How well do relatively poorly prepared, preferentiallyadmitted students do in law school and beyond? Writing in this
journal in 1998, one of us presented an intensive analysis of the
available data on students beginning their professional education
in the Fall of 1991. 74 The results were not encouraging. Of the
black students admitted as a consequence of the weight given to
their racial identity, 22 percent dropped out before graduation. 75
The bar exam was of course another hurdle, and here again,
the news was not good: 27 percent of those who did graduate
were unable to pass within three years of leaving law school. 76
Many of these students had not only devoted three years to preparing themselves for a profession, but were deeply in debt as a
consequence. Of all the beneficiaries of law school admissions
preferences in 1991, 43 percent failed to clear both hurdlesobviously a dismayingly large number. These are figures for only
one group of students; we do not have trend data to draw a fuller
picture. It's unlikely, however, that 1991 was an anomalous year.
If it is at all representative, with no or little positive change over
time- in keeping with LSA T and other scores- there is no reason to believe preferences will have melted away by 2028. Indeed, there may be grounds to worry that, under political pressure, the grading of bar exams will also become race-conscious.
One standard for whites and Asians, another for "underrepresented" minorities. 77 And then, with the compelling need for
"diversity" as a justification, would O'Connor find different

74. Stephan Thernstrom, Diversity and Meritocracy in Legal Education: A Critical
Evaluation of Linda F. Wightman's "The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education," !5
CONST. COMMENT. II (1998).
75. !d. at 29.
76. !d. at 36.
77. It is revealing that recent proposals to raise the passing score on both the Florida and New York bar exams have been strenuously resisted on the grounds that tightening standards would have a disparate impact on blacks; Laurie Cunningham, Raising the
Bar, BROWARD DAILY BUSII'ESS REV., March 26,2003, all; Committee on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, In Opposition to the Board of Law Examiners' Proposal to Increase the Passing Score on the New York Bar Examination, 58 THE REC. OF
THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 97-120 (2003) (if preferential poliCies make law school a "level playing field," why should tightening the standards on the
bar exams have a disparate impact upon black candidates for the bar?).
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passing scores for different races a violation of the equal protection clause?

VIII
In the history of judicial decisions involving racial preferences in education and other spheres, O'Connor's attempt at reassurance-just twenty-five years more, folks-is arguably the
low point in a shocking history of transparently absurd arguments. Ignoring widely available facts, she painted a rosy landscape when the truth is close to catastrophic. It is criminal to offer complacent optimism about the racial gap in academic
achievement. Her majority opinion is a cover-up. The racial gap
in academic achievement is the most important source of ongoing racial inequality. Those who care about the persistence of
that inequality will not engage in such duplicity. Instead, they
will say loud and clear, America must get its educational act together. A racially-identifiable group of educational have-nots is
morally unacceptable. This is a problem that can be fixed. 78
Race has been called the "American dilemma." It is, in fact,
the American undoing-the ground on which we lose our footing, the problem that plays havoc with bedrock American values.
Racial classifications in the United States have a long and ugly
history; racial subordination was all about double standards, with
different entitlements depending on your racial identity. Nevertheless, the highest court in the land has now embraced them
with slipshod, slapdash, reckless, and obfuscating arguments. It is
a bleak day in American constitutional law.
"Because I wish to see all students succeed whatever their
color, I share, in some respect, the sympathies of those who
sponsor the type of discrimination advanced by the University of
Michigan Law School," Justice Thomas wrote, dissenting in
Grutter. 79 Who would disagree? The numbers are painful; the
desire for a quick fix understandable. But, as Thomas went on to
say, "[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on
race .... " 80 They demean us all-especially, he could have
added, when built on foundation of appalling indifference to
facts, logic, and principle.

78.
79.
80.

See THERI"STRO~ & THERNSTROM, supra note 68 passim.
Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003).
/d. at 353.

